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ABSTRACT
Operations managers are becoming more important in modern corporations. They
do not only care on firms’ inventory management but also they are involved in firms’
strategic decisions. Within this setting we ask about the consequences in the inventory
policy of this new role undertaken by these managers. To do so, we develop a model
where a firm’s Operations Manager can devote some efforts to develop non-inventory
related activities. These efforts, although non-verifiable, may be known with a certain
probability if the owner monitors them. Interestingly, by monitoring these efforts, a firm’s
owner may end up stimulating Operations Manager to achieve steep inventory cost
reductions in the short-term. Basic idea is that Operations Manager, in general, avoids
reducing inventory costs significantly in one period because this makes additional cost cuts
difficult which, in turn, reduce expected future inventory-related retribution. However, by
compensating those non-inventory-related efforts may offset these losses. Thus, although
Operations Managers in modern corporations carry out non-inventory related
responsibilities, this may bring about some benefits on inventory costs reduction.
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31/ INTRODUCTION
Operations decissions are becoming more important in the firms’ overall strategy to
achieve a competitive excellence. This process goes in hand with the new role adopted by
Operations Managers within firms. These managers have traditionally focused their efforts
on determining operational decisions such as daily production scheduling and inventory
management. As D’Netto and Sohal (1999) cites, “the UK’s operations managers were seen
as mechanics with dirty finger nails rather than gentlemen”. However, in the modern
corporation, the task of Operations Managers surpasses the traditional technical role on
production scheduling (Oakland and Sohal, 1989, Hum and Lee, 1992, and D’Netto, Sohal
and Trevyllyan, 1998), and the managerial aspects of his job are gaining great importance
(Delaney and Huselid, 1996). Thus, it has become imperative for Operations Managers to
acquire managerial skills. D’Netto and Sohal (1999) shows making use of a sample of
Australian firms, that current operations managers can achieve this knowledge in
management because they are academically well-qualified in order to undertake staff
supervision functions. Moreover, these authors argue that operations managers in the future
should have a greater role to play in setting the strategic direction of the company and
defining competing priorities. To make this trend compatible with an efficient management
of inventories is to design adequate incentive schemes. This is what this article is about.
In principle, one could suspect that Operations Managers involvement in firm’s
strategic decisions may damage their efforts on the “technical” role to manage firm’s
inventory. This may be the case because an Operations Manager that divides her time
between strategy and operations is going to be less specialized in the technical side than a
more focused manager is.
We approach this problem by developing a simple model based on an operation
manager compensation scheme with two channels for retribution. One linked to inventory
costs reduction, and the other that pays for improvements in his “managerial” efforts. Also,
we allow the principal (firm’s owner) to monitor these latter efforts because they are difficult
to verify. Interestingly, by shaping monitoring intensity on non-inventory related efforts,
firm’s owner may end up affecting firm’s inventory policy.
The specific compensation scheme we model hinders steep inventory cost reductions
in the short-term because this precludes relevant future cost cuts which, in turn, will reduce
4future retribution. Interestingly, the incorporation of a compensation package that takes into
account improvements in the non-inventory related efforts, smoothes the previous behavior.
This may be the case because the latter retribution may offset the expected future losses
derived from the initial steep inventory cost reduction. To achieve such an outcome an
Operation Manager should combine in the first period intensive efforts to reduce inventory
costs with low (but non-null) managerial efforts. This gives wide scope for future
retributions linked to improvements in these latter efforts that may offset the expected future
compensation related to limited reduction in inventory costs. Thus, we get some sort of
substitution between inventory-related efforts and non inventory-related ones. And, through
this mechanism, firm’s owner can use monitoring on managerial efforts to shape inventory
cost reductions.
Paradoxically, by incorporating compensation from increases in non-inventory
related efforts, we do find that inventory costs are reduced in a shorter period of time than
when compensation is only based on these latter cost reductions. Also, medium-term
inventory variability is lower under the former compensation scheme than under the latter.
This may cover up the OM long-lasting demand to increase the number of his functions from
operations to management (D’ Netto and Sohal ,1999).
There are different messages that we can extract from the previous feature. Firstly,
firms can try to stimulate the managerial role of their Operations Managers without giving
up inventory efficient management. A correct design of the compensation package can make
both objectives compatible. Secondly, high-tenure Operation Managers involved in
managerial responsibilities may fix firms’ inventories in their optimal inventory level in a
shorter period of time than more specialized ones. This leads to a smoother medium-term
inventory variability in those firms with high-tenure Operations Manager in comparison to
those firms with low-tenure ones. This is partly confirmed in Alfaro and Tribó (2003).
Lastly, by considering workers recruiting as non-inventory related efforts, we can recover
Blinder and Maccini (1991) result. Operation Managers with additional labor hiring
responsibilities may achieve stronger inventory cost reductions in the short-term with lower
inventory variability in the medium-term than those fully specialized on inventory
management.
This paper is divided into six sections. In the following one we build up the model,
which is solved in the third section. We discuss the main theoretical findings in the fourth
5section. A simulation analysis is carried out in section five. In the end, we state some final
remarks.
2/ THE MODEL
We develop a two-period model where an operations manager (OM henceforth) of a
representative firm decides inventory policy as well as some non-contractible managerial
effort. Firm’s owner monitors these latter efforts to compensate accordingly the OM. The
model is built on the following assumptions:
Assumptions
1/ The firm faces a demand tt DD  , where   Dand   ,  to avoid a
negative demand. These   deviations are known at the end of each period and they are
independent and uniformly distributed with a zero mean value. This allows abstracting from
issues related to the demand structure and its impact on firms’ inventory policy. Similar
demand consideration can be found in Kahn (1991), although this paper does not specify the
distribution of demand shock.
2/ Total Cost (TC) is defined as the sum of the costs associated to filling customers’
orders, the cost to carry inventories and the stockout costs. An expression of this function1
is:
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where:
fc  = Filling cost per order.
D = Total demand per period.
hc  = Unitary inventory holding cost.
rc = Unitary inventory stockout cost.
S = Inventory level.
Q = Lot size.
                                                          
1 We have decided to work with [1] because, although the demand includes a stochastic part, the random
noise is uniformly distributed, and, on average, total cost function can be characterized by the previous
function [1] once we substitute the demand by its mean value.
6  = Planning period.
In each period, a firm faces a demand that arrives at a continuous rate and, at the end
of the period, total demand comes out to be tD . Besides, we assume, to simplify, that
demand is attended with constants lots with a Q size. We can think of the existence of some
technological constraints to justify this simplifying assumption.
3/ OM is risk neutral with a two-period temporal horizon. Her compensation is defined
as follows (we implicitly assume a zero discount rate):
))(( 11   ttttt eekTCTCw  [2]
By notation, wt is period-t wage that it is composed of two terms. A fix part,  , and
a variable part ))(( 11   tttt eekTCTC . This latter has also two terms. First one
measures the decrease in the total inventory costs between period t-1, 1tTC , and period t,
tTC . The second term measures managerial effort increase between period t-1, 1te , and
period t, te  
2. With this kind of scheme, firm´s owner stimulates OM to reduce inventory
costs as well as to increase managerial effort, e3.
4/ OM can implement a managerial effort, e, with a cost given by the function C[e]
that satisfies C’[e]>0, C’[e=0]=0 and C’’[e]>0. Moreover, the principal only observes this
effort if he implements a monitoring intensity, M. In particular, with a probability M, effort,
e, is known. To simplify, we assume that this monitoring intensity is exogenously given with
the same value in both periods.
5/ An OM can be fired at the end of the first period, if she has not created net value. In
this case firing costs are zero4. Thus, the ex-ante probability of an OM continuation, pc,
                                                          
2 We have introduced a k factor, as a parameter to homogenize the units used to measure the managerial effort with
those used to measure the variation in the inventory costs. This parameter will also allow us to conduct some
comparative static analysis because it controls the relative weight of the managerial effort to the inventory cost
reduction in the OM compensation scheme.
3 An incentive scheme that would have compensated overall effort, e, in each period instead of the differences in
these efforts would have introduced an asymmetry with regard to the scheme proposed to compensate for the
reduction in inventory costs. In any case, this alternative incentive scheme would have produced an even clearer
result.
4 An OM signs a contract such as she accepts to be fired without compensation if she has not created net value.
Although to deal with considering  positive firing costs does not change any substantial result.
7equals the probability to observe an increase in the value generated by the OM. This can be
achieved by reducing TC, or by increasing managerial effort, e. Therefore, Pc is defined as:
)0()1()0)(( 100110  TCTCprobMeekTCTCMprobpc
In words, this is the (M) probability of knowing effort e times the probability of an
increase in the monitored OM  generated value (including e), plus the probability (1-M) of
not knowing effort e times the probability of an increase in the non-monitored OM generated
value (including e) (without including effort e).
Time-line of the Model
______1_______________2_______________3______________4____
1/ OM simultaneously defines inventory level, S, as well as effort e, taking into
consideration her expectation over future demand realizations as well as the firm’s owner
monitoring intensity M.
2/ First-period demand realization 11  DD  is known at the end of that period. OM
receives her wage and continues in the firm if she has generated value. If not, she is fired and
a new OM is hired.
3/ OM defines second-period inventory policy as well as second-period effort. To do
so she takes into consideration first-period total costs, TC1, first-period effort, e1, as well as
her expectation of second-period demand realization 22  DD .
4/ Last-period demand is realized, and OM receives her payments.
3/ SOLVING THE MODEL
We solve the model in a backward way. Thus, we first characterize second-period
OM decisions. Then, we move to the first period.
8Second-period problem
At t=1, an OM determines second-period inventory level, 2S , as well as second-
period managerial effort, e2. The maximization problem she solves is the following:
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Where, 2e , can only be observed with an M probability which is given by owner’s
monitoring intensity (M).
FOC in this case leads to:
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Trivially, we can see that increases in M and/or k lead to increases in second-period
effort 2e  due to C’’>0. Note also, that effort 2e  depends on M  factor. Either an increase in
the incentive intensity scheme,  , and/or in the monitoring intensity, M, can be used as
substitute mechanisms to stimulate second-period OM efforts, 2e . In words of Chang and
Lai (1999) “there is a trade-off between the wage (carrot) incentive and the supervision
(stick) incentive”. From [4’], we can also observe that second-period optimal inventory level
does not depend on first-period decisions, nor on effort, 2e . This is a consequence to deal
with separable functions.
First-period problem
At t=0, OM determines first-period inventory, 1S , and first-period effort, 1e , taking
the optimal solution found in the second period. The problem she solves is the following:
    1122101100, )))((())((11 eCeeMkTCTCpeeMkTCTCEMax ceS  
By arranging this expression, we can transform the previous maximization problem
into a minimization one:
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First order conditions lead to (see point 1 in the Appendix):
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The solution of this problem leads to an equilibrium that depends on the value of 6:
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Proposition 1
The optimal inventory policy is given by:
a)  If    0ˆ,,0ˆ 21*221  SSSeeeTT
0),,,(ˆ)('0 1
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b)  If  0ˆ T , in that case the equilibrium is given by:
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Proof
See Appendix 1.
4/ DISCUSSION
                                                          
5 The expression of cp  is obtained assuming the demand error term   follows a uniform distribution.
6 See [4] and [4’].
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The equilibrium found shows that whenever an OM implements a positive first-
period managerial effort, 01 e , optimal inventory TC as well as optimal inventory level
that minimizes TC function [1], is most likely achieved in a single period. In this case,
inventory and TC variability between period one and period two is lower (in fact it is null)
than in the situation where managerial effort is null ( 01 e ).
Interestingly whenever 0TC  is high, important reductions on TC are required, and
the compensation scheme must favor managerial efforts, e, (through high k). This makes the
00ˆ 1  eT  outcome more probable. Specifically, the expression of Tˆ  in [9] shows that
when there is an important reduction in first-period total cost ( 101 TCTC   high), there is
also a significant decrease in the T value, which, in turn, also decreases (by [6]) first-period
effort, 1e . The “logic” of this result is that a remarkable reduction of 1TC  generates limited
second-period OM gains because of reductions in TC ( 21 TCTC  ) are more difficult to
achieve when 1TC  is low. A way to offset these “losses” is by reducing first-period
effort 1e , because this opens the possibility of substantial second-period OM gains linked to
managerial effort ( )( 12 eek   may be high when 1e  is low). Thus, increasing OM effort
retribution with a high k, favors the possibility of steep inventory cost reduction in the first
period.
Other remarkable result is that there is some sort of substitution between both
mechanisms (managerial effort and cost reduction) to generate firm value. When OM uses
one mechanism intensively in one period which, in turn, reduces the scope for future benefits
linked to this mechanism, the other is not used so intensively. And, the reverse is true in the
following period. The final outcome is a more efficient management of firm’s inventory
policy. This is what is stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2
OM compensation for her managerial effort allows strong reductions in the inventory-
related costs in order to achieve the optimal long-term inventory level in a short period of
time. This generates, in future periods, a reduced variability in a firm’s inventory level and
in its inventory-related costs.
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Proof
Directly from Proposition 1.
This result comes out to be a stimulus for the firms to promote the managerial role of
OMs. In that case OMs behave less strategically. They reduce TC to the optimal level in a
single period and, then, they focus on implementing high managerial efforts.
Among these other managerial efforts, we can consider those devoted to labor hiring
as Haltiwanger and Maccini (1986) do. These authors show that in case of high demand
shocks variability, a manager may decide to use inventories as well as other mechanisms like
worker turnover to smooth these shocks. In our model, high demand variability (high  )
makes the 0ˆ T  outcome in [8] more probable. This leads to the equilibrium with non-null
managerial effort and smoother inventory policy, which goes in lines with Blinder and
Maccini (1986) results.
Proposition 1 also allows describing those scenarios with high inventory variability
in the medium term as we define it. This is the difference between the second period
inventory level and the first one. Basically, this analysis relies on the inspection of the
expression of Tˆ  when 0ˆ T  7, which can be rearrange d (see the appendix) as:
   )()ˆ((2ˆ 1010 STCESTCEc
QT
f

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[10]
Thus, a more negative Tˆ  means an increase in the difference between S  (first-period
inventories) and Sˆ  (second-period inventories). This means an increase in inventory
variability.
Also, expression Tˆ  in [9] and [10] allows making a straightforward comparative
static analysis with regard to structural parameter like 

 , kTC ,0 . This defines the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3
When initial inventory costs are high enough ( 0TC  high), and/or the fix part in the OM
retribution is much less important than the variable part (

  low), and/or firm’s owner
                                                          
7 The case of 0ˆ T  leads to a null inventory variability.
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monitoring intensity is low enough (M low), and/or effort incentive scheme is low enough (k
low), three features follow. Firstly, inventory policy is highly variable. Secondly, inventory
TC reduction is limited, since the optimal long-term (last-period) level is not achieved until
the second period. And lastly, OM implements no initial managerial efforts.
Proof:
Directly by inspecting Tˆ  and Proposition 1.
This proposition allows describing the different mechanisms that a firm’s owner can
use in order to reduce substantially a firm’s inventory costs without incurring in major
increases in medium-term firm’s inventory variability.
Firstly, to monitor intensively (high M), OM managerial efforts in order to give her
incentives for implementing these efforts. Secondly, to design a retribution scheme that
combines a high fix part with a relevant compensation for OM managerial effort (high k).
Both measures will promote managerial effort e, which is the driving mechanism to achieve
steep short-term TC reduction. This makes that first-period inventory level equals to its long-
term level ( Sˆ ).
Interestingly, whenever initial TC is high and, eventually, a new OM arrives to the
firm to arrange this situation, what we find is that this OM implements no managerial efforts
and focuses mainly in reducing firm’s inventory TC. This is what we can expect from a
newly-hired OM. On the other hand, when a high-tenure OM is in charge, she is also
involved in non inventory-related activities. These OMs have developed the required skills
to carry out other responsibilities not directly related to inventories (i.e. labor policy like the
aforementioned manager of the Blinder and Maccini model). In that case, our model shows
that, good incentives providing, these OMs are able to reduce inventory TC substantially
and, on average, with a smoother inventory policy than that designed by recently-appointed
OMs. This latter result is consistent with the empirical study of Alfaro and Tribó (2003).
Connected with this latter proposition, it is worth to point out an interesting
connection with the literature on contract design (Milgrom and Roberts (1993), among
others). In a context of information asymmetries, a standard result is that the higher the
supervision intensity, M, the more powerful should be the effort incentive mechanism
(high k ). This is because of the signal that captures agent efforts is more accurate when
owner’s monitoring is high. This feature, in terms of our model, leads to ambiguous results
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in a firm’s inventory variability and in an inventory TC reduction. An increase in M reduces
TC and stock variability, while an increase in k  generates an ambiguous outcome. It may
increase, both, TC and inventory variability when it is the result of a raise in  , or decreases
both when k raises. However, we think that parameter k is more relevant to give OM
incentives to implement effort e because it characterizes the relative weight of these efforts
in the variable part of the compensation scheme. In such a situation, there is no ambiguity in
the sign. A positive relationship between owners’s monitoring intensity and a reduction in a
firm’s inventory TC as well as in its stock variability is expected.
As a final comment, we can integrate in our analysis factors related to firm’s market
structure as well as the characteristics of firm’s goods. As a first approximation, we can
consider that a high (low) value of rc  represents mainly competitive (monopolistic) markets,
while a high (low) value of hc  is linked to perishable (perennial) goods. Simple inspection
of Tˆ  in (9) reveals that 0ˆ0ˆ 





hr c
Tand
c
T . Thus, in competitive markets with perishable
goods, we expect those features linked to the 0ˆ T  equilibrium (i.e. steep TC reduction in
the short-term and mild inventory variability in the medium term).
5/ SIMULATION
To show the previous comparative static results and the equilibrium outcome of
Proposition 1, we have developed a numerical example that considers different values of
0TC . We have focused on this variable because it wraps up the initial conditions on the
inventory side.
To enrich our analysis, we contemplate four different scenarios, which are contingent
on the different values of rc  and hc  (see Table 1).
By inspecting Tˆ  in [9] and the equilibrium from Proposition 1, we can deduce that
for high 0TC  values, Tˆ  can be negative, and the equilibrium involves no managerial effort,
high inventory variability and limited TC reduction. We call this a “bad” equilibrium. Thus,
the “good” equilibrium (low inventory variability and steep TC reduction) is achieved when
0TC  is lower than a threshold value, 0TC . This value is obtained by solving the equation
0ˆ T  in [9]. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of 0TC  in terms of Mk (a measure of
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the aforementioned two mechanisms that stimulate managerial effort). There is a positive
relationship between both variables. Thus, to stimulate non-inventory related efforts (Mk
high) is positive in order to achieve the “good” equilibrium as it widens the region where
0TC < 0TC .
PUT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
To carry out our simulations we consider that 2
2
1)( eeC  . Table 1 shows the structural
parameters of the model.
PUT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE
By solving the equilibrium of Proposition 1, Table 2 shows the percentage variation
of TC in period one and in period two. Similarly, we compute inventory variations in both
periods. In all scenarios, we have modified the value of 0TC  from 1.1 times its long-term
value ( *2TC ) to 2.1 times that value
8. And, once fixed 0TC , we have distinguished the case
when Mk>0, in particular Mk=12.5, (to stimulate managerial effort) from the case when
Mk=0.
PUT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
We can extract some conclusions from the previous table:
1/ Once we compare the Mk=0 situation (no effort incentive mechanism) with the
Mk>0 situation, we find that in the first situation, there is always the “bad” equilibrium
( 0TC > 0TC ) independently of the 0TC  value considered. This is not true when Mk=12.5. In
that case, the “good” equilibrium emerges for low values of 0TC  (
*
20 5.1 TCTC  ), especially
in scenarios 2, 3, and 4. This clearly shows the importance of giving OM incentives to
implement managerial effort.
2/ Once we compare the “bad” equilibriums ( 0TC > 0TC ) between the Mk>0 situation
and the Mk=0 one, we find two outcomes. Firstly, there is steeper first-period TC reduction
                                                          
8  We rule out 0TC  values lower than 
*
2TC  because they lead to the “good” equilibrium in all scenarios.
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in the former situation in comparison to the latter. Secondly, there is lower inventory
variability in the Mk>0 case. Thus, we can say that the “bad” equilibrium is especially bad in
the Mk=0 situation.
3/ In terms of scenarios, we observe that 0TC  does not change for Scenarios 2 and 3.
They are symmetric as unit holding costs of scenario 2 (3) coincide with unit stock out costs
of scenario 3 (2). Moreover this common 0TC  is a middle value between the value of the
low-cost scenario (scenario 4) and that of the high-cost scenario (scenario 1). In this latter
costly scenario, firms have more incentive to reduce substantially TC in a single period (this
is what happens in the “good” equilibrium 0TC < 0TC ).
4/ Interestingly enough, when comparing scenario 2 (competitive framework and
perennial good) with scenario 3 (monopolistic environment and perishable good) we find a
symmetric outcome concerning TC reduction. This means that the competitive pressure over
a firm from its competitors  is a perfect substitute of the pressure from the perishability of
their own goods. This symmetric outcome is not translated to inventory policy, where there
is more pressure to decrease inventories when goods are perishable (scenario 3) than when
markets are competitive (scenario 2). Moreover, in the former scenario firms show, in
general, the highest inventory variability. In this scenario the combination of high holding
costs with low stockout costs favors steep inventory reduction.
5/ CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we show that an Operations Manager (OM) that devotes some efforts to
non-inventory related activities may outperform an OM exclusively devoted to the
management of inventories. This is by designing a payment scheme that combines the
reward of inventory management efforts with other value-generating (managerial) efforts.
The idea is that an OM has low incentives to reduce significantly inventory costs in the
short-term because this implies a lower margin to reduce it in the future, and this, in turn,
may erode his expected future rewards. Thus, an OM will only have incentives to make such
reductions if these future losses are offset with other gains. These may be achieved by
16
rewarding conveniently his non-inventory (managerial) efforts. Within the scheme we
propose, we find the following pattern. Initially, OMs devote more efforts to reduce
inventory costs than to their managerial responsibilities . However, in the next period the
managerial component of OM efforts is more important. Thus, paradoxically, by combining
both types of effort there is an intense inventory cost reduction to achieve in just one period
the optimal inventory level.  This may not be true when the OM only manage firm’s
inventory policy. This provide an explanation to OM demand to increase the number of his
functions along the time (D’ Netto and Sohal,1999).
Our analysis also allows highlighting different features. Firstly, in an efficient
contract design framework, once we compare firms with high-tenure OM with those with
low-tenure, a smoother medium-term inventory variation is expected in the former in
comparison to the latter. This is partly confirmed in Alfaro and Tribó (2003). Lastly, those
firms with an OM involved in an increasing amount of responsibilities, need not be worried
for the apparent OM lack of focus. A correct design of the compensation package can
overcome all these problems.
Our model has some important limitations. This is a two-period static model that
does not allow analyzing the dynamics of the OM role within the firm. Also, we have limited
the decision set of OM inventory management to just one variable. Questions of information
asymmetries are also ruled out for the sake of simplicity. However, although simple, our
model is able to provide a set of empirical predictions concerning firm’s inventory
variability. We expect lower inventory variability in those firms with high-tenure OMs
(which, in principle, they are able to be engaged in those managerial efforts), and/or with
relevant managerial bonus, and/or in those firms efficiently monitored (i. e with banks as
shareholders). Also, from our model we get that OM compensation package is mainly based
on inventory cost reduction in the short-term and on managerial efforts in the medium-term.
Finally, once we incorporate some additional questions of market microstructure, we get that
in competitive markets with a high unitary holding cost we find the superior inventory
variability. The test of these theoretical outcomes will be the subject of some future research.
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Thus, this is a minimum. Moreover, as Sˆ  is a minimum for )( 1ST , then the condition 0ˆ T
ensures that 0)( 1 ST  for any 1S . This feature neglects the T=0 solution as a possible
minimum in [A1.4].
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Figure 1. Graphic of 0TC  with regard to Mk
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TABLE 1
SCENARIOS
D =5,000 ; 1 =250 ; 2 =250
01500500 0  e
=30  =1 cf=1 Q=100 Mk=12.5
Scenario 1: Perishable and competitive ch=45 ; cr=45
Scenario 2: Perennial and competitive ch=15 ; cr=45
Scenario 3: Perishable and low competitive ch=45 ; cr=15
Scenario 4: Perennial and low competitive ch=45 ; cr=45
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Table 2
Scenario 1 (45-45) ; TC2* = 1175 ; 0TC =1366.25 (1210) ; S2*=50
TC0=1.3TC2* TC0=1.7TC2* TC0=1.9TC2*
MK>0 1,2 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0
(TC0-TC1)/TC0 (%) 17,80 12,68 25,38 21,46 30,07 26,90
(TC1-TC2*)/TC1 (%) 6,42 11,90 21,17 25,10 31,91 34,86
SD(%VS) 3 19,86 20,98 27,41 28,11 31,73 32,19
Scenario 2 (15-45) ; TC2*=612,5 ; 0TC = 803,75 (647.50) ;S2*=75
TC0=1.3TC2* TC0=1.7TC2* TC0=1.9TC2*
MK>0 1,2 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0
(TC0-TC1)/TC0 (%) 23,08 13,74 29,77 22,27 33,62 27,55
(TC1-TC2*)/TC1 (%) 0,00 10,83 16,24 24,32 28,26 34,27
SD(%VS) 3 17,36 13,73 18,53 19,51 22,26 23,04
Scenario 3 (45-15) ; TC2*=612,5 ; 0TC = 803,75 (647.50) ;S2*=25
TC0=1.3TC2* TC0=1.7TC2* TC0=1.9TC2*
MK>0 1,2 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0
(TC0-TC1)/TC0 (%) 23,08 13,74 29,77 22,27 33,62 27,55
(TC1-TC2*)/TC1 (%) 0,00 10,83 16,24 24,32 28,26 34,27
SD(%VS ) 3 34,93 30,01 37,17 38,26 41,87 42,51
Scenario 4 (15-15) ; TC2*=425 ; 0TC  = 616,25 (460) ; S2*=50
TC0=1.3TC2* TC0=1.7TC2* TC0=1.9TC2*
MK>0 1,2 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0 MK>0 Mk=0
(TC0-TC1)/TC0 (%) 23,08 14,71 33,82 23,01 36,90 28,15
(TC1-TC2*)/TC1 (%) 0,00 9,81 11,11 23,60 24,53 33,72
SD(%VS) 3 25,72 20,88 27,13 28,47 31,59 32,71
1  The dashed region represents the “good-type” of equilibrium
2  Mk=25
3  This is 2
1
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